KISHWER FALKNER
Baroness Falkner of Margravine
Home | Bio | Parliament | Public Speaking | Journalism | Contact "US Foreign Policy and Democracy in the Muslim World: Options After Iraq"
Speech to have been delivered at the University of Pittsburgh, 19 February 2007
The topic was the basis of a study group conducted at the Institute of Politics, Kennedy School of Government, at Harvard University. My own background in ‘Democracy Building’ started with the work of the Westminster Foundation for Democracy – a body that was established by British Prime Minister Thatcher in 1991 after the collapse of the Berlin wall and the velvet revolutions of Eastern Europe. I have in the intervening 15 years, worked in support of democratic institutions across the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
For those of us who came to the West from authoritarian and undemocratic regimes – and I have experienced a good number of those in my time – we grew up despairing the traditional approach of the US and to a lesser degree the EU. This was the post Second World War position of the U.S. – ‘realpolitik’, epitomised by the policy pursued under Henry Kissinger and Richard Nixon in the 70s. The intellectual basis of this position had been there for a very long time, better known as the realist view of international relations. In the realist mindset, the US national interest (as defined by relevant administrations of the time) was paramount. It was narrowly perceived and rigorously implemented. The country’s strategic goals were to secure a world where deals would be done purely on the basis of what mattered to the US. Rulers would be supported or removed from power not on the basis of their legitimacy, or considerations of their own positions, but purely on the basis of whether they, in the US view, were ideologically ‘with us or against us’ – in those days the war was against communism, not terrorism! Occasionally, the US indulged in terrorism to defeat communism but that was alright – our own terrorists/freedom fighters were good terrorists. Or so the people of Chile, El Salvador, Honduras, or further away in Iran and Afghanistan were told.
The realist tradition of US foreign policy, which did much to prop up authoritarian regimes from south East Asia through Africa to Latin America did untold damage to the aspirations of those who sought freedom. But nowhere was this more dangerous that in the Muslim world. Countries throughout the Middle East and Asia experienced US support for unpleasant dictatorships – Sukarno in Indonesia; the Shah in Iran; Zia ul Haq in Pakistan; Sadat and Mubarak in Egypt; the Saudi royal family in Saudi Arabia, to mention just a few.
What was significant in this thirty years from the 60s to the 90s was that most of these countries had just gained independence, and were in the process of nation building. They did not have cohesive ethnic and national identities with a tradition of self-rule spanning decades – not to mention centuries as is the case with Europe and the US. Now in defence of US policy, people are bound to say that communism was such a compelling force that this was the lesser of two evils. I would argue to the contrary – Apart from Afghanistan, in none of the countries mentioned was communism a potent force such that it might have taken over; which is not to say that it wasn’t an excuse for authoritarianism. Indonesia, Pakistan and Iran had traditionally been US allies; the Saudi’s had been allies from the outset. While Egypt under Nasser had sought Pan Arabism – this was not the same as communism. In fact, the most cursory study of Islam as a religion demonstrates how inimical it is to communist ideology. One only has to look at the Muslim Central Asian republics and how brutally they had to be ruled from Stalin’s time onwards to be held down, to see that communism in practice and ideology, was simply incompatible with Islamic thinking.
To its credit, the US government has recognised how wrong its policies were. In a speech in June 2005, Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice declared in Cairo
We should look to the future when every government respects the will of its citizens – because the ideal of democracy is universal. For 60 years, my country, the United States, pursued stability at the expense of democracy in this region here in the Middle East – and we achieved neither. Now, we are taking a different course. We are supporting the democratic aspirations of all people.
But moving on from realism – the view that the US strategic interests would always overrule considerations or democracy and good governance, we found ourselves in the post cold-war era. This, I wrote in a policy paper for the Liberal Democrats in 1993, was the most dangerous period. It was dangerous because the old systems had been thrown out, but we did not really know how the new world would pan out. Thankfully, the transitions to democracy of the countries of the old Soviet bloc went reasonably well with a few exceptions. But the experience of the last 15 years has given us many lessons. Before I turn to those, I want to remain with US foreign policy for a little longer. What seemed to happen here in the US and indeed in Western Europe, was a desire to capitalise on the demise of communism, by grasping the mantle of liberal democracy and exporting it to the rest of the world.
This of itself – a policy to change the world for the better; to enhance the rule of law and to extend the promise of freedom to millions of others, is not of itself new. In the form we know it today, it was articulated by President Woodrow Wilson in his famous 14 point plan in 1918. And let me say that I endorse these sentiments, and wholeheartedly believe that the lives of all people, Muslim and non-Muslim alike, fare better under liberty and freedom than in its absence.
And what we saw in the 90’s was a nuanced change from traditional realism which I will describe as a shift towards a more ‘ethical’ perspective under Bill Clinton. It was in this period that US developmental aid to the poorest countries was enhanced, when dictatorships were given warnings to change or else, and where serious efforts were undertaken to solve conflicts around the world – from Bosnia to Beirut; from Palestine to Pakistan and India; from South Africa to Sierra Leone - US power, diplomatic and military, was used to save lives, to bring about democracy and to strive for peace. It was in this period that US foreign policy was engaged, sometimes tentatively, sometimes wrongly, but usually in the spirit of constructive engagement to make things better – a policy that employed ‘multilateralism’. When things went wrong, as they did in Somalia, or with terrorism in East Africa, the rest of the world understood and sympathised. When there were abject failures as we saw over the Rwandan genocide, then the limits of any internationalist policy became all to clear.
And so it was till 9/11. Although the warning signs of what was to come from Neoconservative driven ‘neo-imperialism’ was evident for some years before – President Clinton has long been urged by Neoconservatives to use force to remove Saddam from power. So while the Neoconservative agenda had existed for some time, what had happened in the intervening period was that many prominent members of this group had gained importance within and established base in the Republican party and to some extent, cast its foreign policy thinking into their own mould. The fact that this wasn’t the explicit deal made with the country in the 2000 election campaign has had repercussions around the world. So while it is fashionable to say that everything changed after 9/11. I would argue that it had been changing for some time – senior appointments in the Bush administration from 2000 pointed the way, if people had sought to draw the relevant conclusions.
What 9/11 did, was that it proved to be the catalyst for long standing Neoconservative preoccupations which are all confrontational: here I single out a preoccupation with the Middle East in particular and broader Islam itself. Not global Islamism, which I suggest is an ideology, however unpalatable; but the faith of itself. The implications of this are, of course, that all 1.5 million Muslim are therefore suspect – not the few hundred who are terrorists, nor indeed the millions who might be ‘anti-American’, but all of us who profess to the faith. This is in part due to that other Neoconservative predilection: that their religious beliefs put them in an exceptional position to take on the role of pursuing ‘good’ over ‘evil’. The final Neoconservative ideological tenet that I will pick out today is the one which damages US foreign policy most, and is perhaps the best known: that is, that the fundamental determinant of the relationship between states, rests on military power and the willingness to use it. This is the road which has led to the carnage in Iraq every day, and it had echoes in Lebanon last summer. Whether we now find the road to Jerusalem via Tehran, is an open question.
So I think by this point I have made clear that the change in US foreign policy from the traditionalist realist position, which it held for most of the post-war period to the Neoconservative catastrophe which has been the prevailing orthodoxy till last year, have both been catastrophic in their effects in the Islamic world. You would therefore we well entitled to ask what I think should be the direction of US policy today.
Before I come to that I want to set out some thoughts on the Islamic world itself. It would be to evade responsibility completely to deny that in the post war period, most Muslim majority countries have been ruled abysmally. This poor leadership was best documented in the United Nations Arab Human Development Report of 2002. The shocking statistics of the reality of people’s lives are now well known. Poverty, ill-health, the lack of opportunities, the lack of a basic education as well as all the other indices of human development are there for all to know of. As the authors, all Arab themselves stated
The Arab world is at a crossroads. The fundamental choice is whether its trajectory will remain marked by inertia, as reflected in much of the present institutional context and by ineffective policies …. Or whether prospects for an Arab renaissance, anchored in human development will be actively pursued.
This description is not unique alas to the Middle East. It is the condition of many Muslim-majority states outside the Middle East as well. The stories of Indonesia, Pakistan or Bangladesh are testament to similar lost opportunities for several generations.
So while I take it as given that the people of these countries have been let down by their rulers, I want to keep the focus of this talk on US policy and democracy. The shift in the US to emphasise democracy for those countries of US policy as articulated in President Bush’s second inaugural speech and then in last year’s State of the Union address was stark and bears repeating:
Our offensive against terror involves more than military action. Ultimately, the only way to defeat the terrorists is to defeat their dark vision of hatred and fear by offering the hopeful alternative of political freedom and peaceful change. So the United States of America supports democratic reform across the Middle East….
The very premise of this thinking – that we can defeat terrorism through democracy is wrong on several counts: To suggest that terrorists can be defeated by democracies casts aside years of experience that demonstrate that terrorism is actually more prevalent in democracies – how many people can name a global terrorist organisation in the People’s Republic of China, or North Korea, or for that matter in Iran? On the other hand we know from bitter experience that it is the fact of open dissent converted to violence that allowed the IRA to flourish in Northern Ireland; or for the Basque separatists to survive in Spain; or the Red Army Faction and the Italian Red Brigade to have existed in German and Italy respectively. This is not to say that they do not exist in authoritarian countries, I am just positing that the picture of terrorism is rather more complicated than democracy v dictatorship alone.
But the premise is also wrong on the record of recent events, and very often delivers perverse results: We know that when Palestinian people had free and fair elections in January 2006, they elected a Hamas government. We know that after the Israeli bombings of Lebanon in 2006, if the Lebanese people would go to the polls today, it is likely that Hizbullah would win. We can also anticipate that if Mr Mubarak were to relinquish power in Egypt after nearly three decades, in any kind of free contest, that the Muslim Brotherhood would sweep the board.
Now one can have two reactions to this state of affairs: you might conclude that the wrong sort of government coming to power precludes attempts at democratic reform; so we are better of supporting authoritarianism (the realist position). Or you might conclude, as the remaining Neocons are prone to – that intervention is right, but what we just need to get better at is the implementation stage. If that goes right, as they say over the Iraq debacle, so would everything else. Now what this latter analysis does not explain is how you would get the right outcome in an election short of running them yourselves after an invasion. What guarantee would you have that the results in Pakistan or Palestine would deliver our kind of ‘sonofabitch’ to use that famous Kissinger-days aphorism?
I would posit that you should have been consistent in support of democracy: If you accept my view that we cannot get democracy through the barrel of a gun – then you might be amenable to accepting that we should, in most circumstances, live with the results of democratic elections. Even where the people elected are unpalatable to us.
Looking at the Middle East as well as some other parts of the Muslim world, one can see two choices: the choice between propping up authoritarian rulers on the basis that they are friendly to us; or the other choice is that Islamist parties, like the Muslim Brotherhood and variations thereof, will get elected. If we stay with more of the same in the hope that this will combat terrorism and maintain stability, then we are fooling ourselves and perpetuating - or at best walking away - from tyranny. We are then caught between the tentacles of Al Qaeda or alternatively the ‘The Uzbekistan Model’ of international relations – both are Faustian pacts.
On the other hand, one might make the right choice, which is to be consistent that democracy is the only viable alternative, and that the use of a combination of diplomacy, incentives and sanctions to leverage aside the worst dictators and to move those countries towards pluralism is the way forward. One model of how this might work is set out by Steven Cook, who calls it The Promise of Pacts. For a detailed look at this I suggest you refer to his article in the Journal of Democracy, (Vol 17, 1 January 2006) where he outlines the case.
Cook’s thinking is that to hope for incremental small moves to democracy in authoritarian regimes is illusory, as leaders have nothing to gain from giving up power in exchange for democracy. So the challenge is to work out what circumstances they might willingly go along with a process which could lead to their eventual demise. He sees the solution in building in guarantees for these leaders into the democratic transitions themselves. These transitions would take the form of two phases: first, an extrication from authoritarian politics – when all the forces opposed to the ‘status quo’ form alliances; and the second phase, the constitutional phase when they all sides work together to consolidate democratic institutions and keep all sides in the game. The extrication phase would be undoubtedly difficult due to the polarised positions between those who have power and those who want it. It would call for case by case innovations. To make this ‘democracy with guarantees’ stick, the transition pacts between regime leaders and the opposition would be power-sharing arrangements, seeking to ensure gradual, long-term political transitions which protect the interests, over a period of time, of all those involved.
Cook accepts that pacts are undemocratic, but advocates their use as they flatten out the process of change thus giving time for democratic institutions to bed down. He also acknowledges that certain conditions would have to be met for this to succeed: First, there would have to be a willingness on the part of leaders to cooperate; there would have to be a commitment to ‘play by the rules of the game’; opposition ‘radicals’ would need to be brought in by the moderates and most importantly, hard liners within the regime would have to be brought in. This final point, of what to do with the military would appear to be extremely difficult to surmount as the experience of Egypt and Pakistan show, but the very point of ‘pacts’ is to come up with transitional arrangements which seek to protect most players’ interests. Turkey which had a long transition of military rule has recently shown that it is possible for the military to be subservient to a pro-Islamist government. Indonesia is also worth watching as is Algeria, in this regard.
But to be specific, if one were to take Egypt as the case in point, it would not be inconceivable that a deal be done with Mubarak which includes his son Gamal, the hier apparent, and might go like this: that we accept that either father or son will indeed contest the next election in 2011, and work on the opposition to allow that to go ahead; but in exchange we insist on the constitutional change to a two term limit for President. Alongside those negotiations we also broker a role for the opposition in power sharing through taking control of some ministries. Experience indicating that running government makes for the art of the possible – we become more pragmatic. Finally the tricky part of the election is managing the winners and losers – in transitional elections, for lets say, two cycles, we might have to reserve a role for the ruling party, the National Democratic Party, and preserve some of the privileges that the military enjoys today.
It would not be easy, but it would give Egyptians (and the rest of Arab street) assurances that we are sincere about our attempts to assist them on a democratic trajectory. A variant of this methodology might also be translatable to Pakistan where the US is caught in a bind between supporting a dictator – benign though he is – and a combination of secular and Islamist oppositions.
Now there is no doubt that these pacts will involve us (I speak broadly of the US and the EU) working with Islamist parties and therein lies the challenge. Do we accept that the secular alternative is not really possible and opt for a combination of the secular and the sacred, or do we eschew the Islamists entirely? I believe that it is impossible to foresee the Muslim world of the future as devoid of the religious traditionalists. So my premise is that we must accept these actors as ‘players’ and work in a pragmatic spirit, and the knowledge that the actual exercise of power usually moderates those previously radical. Sinn Fein is a case in point. But for those of you who have memories of FIS in Algeria in 1992, what would political settlements along these lines consist of?
In first instance, the US would need to reiterate that it did not consider the ruling arrangements in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, and many of the other I have mentioned as acceptable. I suggest that this be done ‘sotto voce’ rather than through the use of megaphone diplomacy. The European Union, United Nations, the Organisation of the Islamic Council and bilateral negotiations could be the vehicles. While there would undoubtedly be resistance, the fact of public support for democratic pluralism must be used as a lever, while making clear to those publics that their democratic choices would be respected.
What would happen you might ask, if this ushers in Islamists? Let me spell out what this might involve in Muslim societies which divide along tribal, class, and historic cleavages. In transitions, the organisation of institutions would have to rest on several pillars which combine the secular and the sacred. To attempt to bring about a totally secular state in Muslim-majority countries is I think unworkable in a free society where free choices are made. Thus democrats in the West have to accept that Muslim societies may well choose alternatives for governance which are less ‘liberal’ than we have developed over several hundred years of self-government. So whereas in the area of justice, the civil code might be our norm, it is unlikely that Muslim societies which are democratic would choose that as the sole basis for themselves. In family law, inheritance, banking and a range of other areas, there is Muslim, Sharia-based guidance which may well be preferable to those who are more pious. In criminal law the debate would be more contentious as here there is a big divide between liberal democracies and Muslim remedies.
I would argue that perhaps the resolution of this debate and its ‘modern interpretation’ should be left to the people of the respective country. Indonesia, Malaysia and to a lesser extent Pakistan are finding innovative solutions to the drawing the boundaries between secular and sacred in law. It took us several hundred years after the reformation in Europe – we need to give it time here, too.
Likewise, our understanding of liberal democracy relies on certain models – the rule of law; institutional structures such as an independent judiciary, a free media, an emphasis on the individual as the possessor of human agency. Alongside these structures is the necessary condition that the population be able to be sufficiently informed to make free choices – a condition rather absent in the reality of the illiteracy of millions in these societies. The promise of Western backed, genuine transitions, undertaken over a period of time and supported through institution building, educational and development assistance is the only realistic option for both those societies and for the stability that we favour.
Now there may well be some of you who think that I am indulging in moral relativism – that I use the freedom afforded to me as a Western Liberal to ask for the replacement of one kind of system – authoritarianism - with another, the acceptance of Islamism, which will not doubt deliver less freedom than the ‘liberal democratic nation’ model. I do not do so lightly. My argument rests on the recognition that while each individual is endowed with the same inalienable rights, that we have to recognise that Muslim societies are different in their emphasis on Western institutions. Hence the idea of social justice is given much higher priority in Islamic society than economic growth – pace the concept of the global umma or community of Muslims; likewise, piety and law and intrinsically linked, unlike our own deliberately separate structures. Finally, gender equality, while entirely valid will have to be undertaken in a different manner with the state being the foremost player and society lagging behind rather than the other way around which has been the case in the West. And the most difficult area – that of human rights, may be one where we might have to seek a more fundamental, and limited set of rights as a first step in those societies. A sort of acceptance of the ‘greatest good of the greatest number…’ argument.
So in conclusion, I ask us to accept that we cannot impose democracy in the Islamic world, but we have indeed a role to play as an active partner. If that partnership involves living through some messy transitional stages, when the wrong people are elected, as democrats, we have to make the best of it. This is not a passive partnership – the US should engage actively to mould the world in a more progressive light, but should also accept that it will not happen overnight. There is much at stake here, and still time to remedy the wrongs of more recent times.
Baroness Kishwer Falkner
The Ford Institute for Human Security, University of Pittsburgh, 19 February 2007
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